July 2022 Amtrak Financial Report

  • The report was dated August 31, 2022, and posted on Amtrak’s site on September 7, 2022.  

  • The NEC generated for nine months cash operating loss of $114.1 million (as determined by their accounting system) and the remainder of the system had an operating cash loss of $677.7 million. Combined, the entire system had for the period cash operating deficit of $791.7 million. For the month of July, both the Acela and Northeast Regionals posted surpluses. However, because the infrastructure account is considered part of the NEC, the entire NEC for the month of July showed a loss.

  • Year to date, the NEC made debt service payments totaling $52.0 million and capital expenditures of $924.0 million. Counting all capital sources, the NEC account has a negative balance of $322.1 million, offset by the cash reserves from previous years.

  • For the rest of the national system, $1.2 million was needed for debt service and $773.4 million was spent on capital expenditures. The National Network account balance is now a negative $536.7 million, offset by the accumulated surplus from previous years. 

  • Appropriated money for the combined NEC and National Network received for the year to date was $1.2 billion.  Amtrak has also received from other capital sources $499.9 million for the entire system. The Administration seems to be paying out appropriations after the money has been spent.

  • The combined accumulated reserves at the beginning of the 2022 fiscal year totaled $491.9 million in cash and cash equivalents, $390.2 million in short-term investments, and $3.3 billion in available-for-sale securities. The total cash reserves as of October 1, 2021, is $4.1 billion. The current ratio (Current Assets divided by Current Liabilities) was 2.383 which would make Amtrak quite credit-worthy for any fresh borrowings.

  • Amtrak's burn rate for October 2021 (Operating Revenues-Minus Operating Expense-Minus Debt Service-Capital Expenditures) was $446.1 million (this includes the $217.6 million for debt service), $155.0 million for November, $29.7 million for December (because of the retraction of money spent on debt service which in turn explains the much lower figure), $294.6 million for January, $221.4 million for February, $318.6 million for March, $221.4 million for April, $264.4 million for May, $351.1 million for June, and $229.8 million for July.

  • Capital spending for year to date was: Engineering $546.1 million, Mechanical $292.9 million (only $15.7 million in the month of July at a time when the company is suffering equipment shortages), Operations $17.0 million, Digital Technology $111.7 million, Commercial and Marketing $0.1 million, ADA $82.0 million, Real Estate Stations & Facilities $113.0 million, Amtrak Police & Emergency Management $11.0 million, Safety $14.8 million, Environmental $5.6 million, Procurement $2.9 million, Acela 21 $153.4 million, Gateway $66.4 million, Planning & Strategy $75.8 million, B&P Tunnel $33.6 million, and intercity Trainsets $153.0 million. The total was $1.7 billion which is $157.8 million less than in the same period last year.

  • The GAAP Loss for the first ten months appears to be $1.6 billion which is $115.2 million better than the same period in FY2021. The cash operating earnings for the year to date was $118.2 million better than in FY2021.

  • For cash operating earnings, the corporation is $18.0 million behind the July Forecast. The GAAP figure is $7.7 million behind the July Forecast.

  • The number of product lines showing a measurable operating surplus for the period remained at five. The four with a surplus of more than $1 million were:

    • Auto Train $21.1 million

    • Illini $3.4 million

    • Kansas City-St. Louis $1.4 million

    • Washington-Richmond $1.1 million

    • Two additional product lines broke even.

    • The four Virginia product lines generated a total loss of $11.0 million.

  • Amtrak in a rare burst of clarity in now showing costs based as frequency variable costs, route variable costs, and system fixed costs. This resembles short-term variable costs, long-term variable costs and fully allocated costs that used to be reported in Amtrak’s early days. Most trains covered their frequency variable costs with the exception of Ethan Allen, Coast Starlight, Sunset, Southwest Chief, California Zephyr, Empire Builder, Texas Eagle, Lake Shore Ltd, City of New Orleans, and the Cardinal. Most likely the constrained consists from Amtrak mismanagement of its personnel and equipment repairs contributed to these trains not meeting their Frequency Variable Costs.

  • Ridership for the nine months rose more than 9,533,000 from the comparable period in FY2021. For the year to date, it stands at 18,360,000 (Amtrak reports ridership to the nearest 100). The total number of riders in all of July was 2, 375,400. The situation with the long-distance trains shows a gain of riders across the product lines with the obvious exception of the Silver Meteor. The biggest losers in FY2021 were the ones with the highest percentage gains. The Silver Star was the greatest winner at a 142.2% gain for the new fiscal year so far. The Palmetto was second at a 133.5% gain. The lines that showed the smallest ridership gains after the Silver Meteor which lost 47.5%, the Cardinal with a positive percent of 20.9%, The Sunset at +31.5%, and the Acela gained 177.7%.

  • The Chief appears to be running better but it is still erratic. The Lake Shore Ltd. and the Capitol Ltd. continue to have good timekeeping.

  • Congress is indicating that a short-term CR will be passed covering through after the election. But that is a source of friction between Bernie Sanders and Joe Manchin over a Manchin rider to the CR. This could cause the CR to be delayed.

Steve Musen, Representative from Rhode Island to NARP’s Council of Representatives